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field as a bulwark against further encroachments by economics and 
other social sciences on the autonomy of law as a discipline." In-
deed, it would be fair to say, despite his protestations to the con-
trary, that he doubts there is such a field. In addition to the fact 
that most law professors, with good reason, find law a boring sub-
ject, there has been, Posner notes, a "flight from humanities to law 
by graduate students and young faculty, who in the 1970s saw jobs 
and promotion opportunities and salaries falling steeply in real (that 
is, inflation-adjusted) terms and decided to go to law school and 
who today see in the field of law and literature a means of amortiz-
ing their original training." Not only does teaching in a law school 
generally pay much better than teaching in an English department, 
but the accomplishments necessary to achieve recognized expertise 
as a literary analyst and theoretician are much less demanding. It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that whether or not it is a subject, law 
and literature is a burgeoning enterprise. 
THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF LEO STRAUSS. By Shadia 
B. Drury.1 New York: St. Martin's Press. 1988. Pp. xv, 256. 
$29.95. 
Mark Tushnet 2 
As an undergraduate I was exposed to the study of the 
Supreme Court by the historically oriented political scientist Robert 
McCloskey. While I was in law school I became acquainted with 
the behavioral study of the Court by other political scientists. It 
took a while for me to assimilate what law professors had to say 
about constitutional law, so for several years I stopped reading what 
political scientists had to say. When I again started reading consti-
tutional studies by political scientists, I came to realize that there 
was an entirely new-at least new to me-world out there. This 
was the work, I now know, of the Straussians. I have learned that 
there are East Coast Straussians and West Coast Straussians, 
though I am not yet familiar enough with the territory to provide a 
decent map. (As I understand it, both groups think that democracy 
is a Bad Thing, but one group thinks that the United States Consti-
tution fortunately doesn't rest on democratic principles while the 
other group thinks that it unfortunately does.) 
What I read of Straussians on constitutional law was interest-
I. Associate Professor of Political Science. University of Calgary. 
2. Professor of Law. Georgetown Cniversity Law Center. 
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ing, in a quirky sort of way. Their devotion to incredibly close read-
ings of certain classic texts was admirable, though it was sometimes 
unclear to me why some texts were singled out and others ignored. 
At the same time their works had a peculiar tone. This was partly 
due to the enormous self-assurance with which they offered their 
readings, as if they had finally uncovered the real meaning of the 
texts for the first time when, it seemed to me, they were offering 
interesting but not dazzlingly original interpretations. Partly the 
tone resulted from the sense the Straussians conveyed that these 
texts were actually contemporary documents, speaking directly and 
without any historical mediation-though of course with the media-
tion of the Straussians-to us today. 
I approached Professor Shadia Drury's book with the hope 
that it would help me decide whether I ought to devote more time 
to immersing myself in Strauss's works. When I read on page four 
that Professor Drury "generally found his commentaries on the 
classic texts arid, insipid, tedious and repetitive," and that she "was 
sympathetic with those reviewers who were genuinely perplexed as 
to how such rubbish could have been published," I had a clue to the 
answer, even though she immediately continued that she "began to 
find the work of Leo Strauss fascinating, captivating, and even be-
witching." By the end of the book, where Drury writes, "Strauss 
corrupts . . . . Strauss seduces young men into thinking that they 
belong to a special and privileged class of individuals that transcend 
ordinary humanity and the rules applicable to other people," I was 
certain. The Straussian enterprise of close reading is useful and 
may yield some interesting insights, but the method and the insights 
are entirely independent of the political theory offered by Strauss 
himself. 
According to Drury, Strauss's political theory relies on a dis-
tinction between the overt statements made by philosophers, their 
exoteric philosophy, and the true meaning of their teaching, their 
esoteric philosophy. I can understand the attractions of this distinc-
tion, from the point of view of ambitious academics. Because the 
esoteric meaning is concealed, a Straussian can make a reputation 
by discovering the true meaning of some text, which has been con-
cealed and overlooked from the beginning. Of course, it also allows 
the academic to congratulate himself or herself for the discovery. 
Interestingly, too, the method appears to have some similarities to 
the methods of deconstruction, which are popular on the academic 
left these days; the esoteric philosophy is revealed by interpreting 
the silences and the gaps-what deconstructionists call aporias-in 
the text. 
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This basic distinction, though, seems unlikely to be of much 
use to students of constitutional law. Although Drury does not say 
so explicitly, I assume that Strauss did not believe that every text 
has an esoteric meaning, but only the texts of the great philoso-
phers. I doubt that any of the Justices of the Supreme Court would 
qualify for esoteric readings. This is what appears to distinguish the 
Straussian approach from deconstruction, which claims that hidden 
meanings are concealed in every text. 
Supreme Court opinions cannot qualify for Straussian readings 
for another reason. Strauss distinguishes between philosophers and 
statesmen, and, as Drury presents his thought, the philosophers 
come out far ahead. They are dedicated to discovery of the truth. 
Unfortunately for society, though, the truth is necessarily destabi-
lizing. As Drury puts it, "the truths of philosophy are profoundly 
at odds with the sorts of pious myths and illusions on which any 
society must necessarily rest. The truths of philosophy therefore 
come into conflict ... with all societies. Philosophy therefore un-
dermines ideas that it recognizes to be necessary to the continued 
existence of the city." What, then, is to be done? According to 
Drury, "For Strauss, the task of political philosophy in the world is 
to educate a special elite that will exert its influence in political life." 
This elite, the statesmen, will be educated by the philosophers, but 
they won't know the truth, for if they did they would be ineffective 
as statesmen. As Drury says, the statesmen are "a special breed ... 
capable of harboring the noble self-delusions without which the city 
cannot exist." 
Again, this is pretty flattering to philosophers, and it might 
make legal academics happy if they believed that what they write in 
law reviews is in some sense more important than what the Justices 
write in the United States Reports. In this view, law review articles 
are examples of edifying discourse. 
This suggests another connection between Straussian political 
theory and contemporary constitutional theory. Strauss defends the 
ancient philosophers against the degeneration of modernity. As 
Drury makes clear, the basis for the defense is that the ancient phi-
losophers more clearly understood the role that civic virtue and 
dedication to the public good play in producing good government. 
Modern philosophers, in contrast, attempt unsuccessfully to ground 
government in the preferences of individuals. As this summary in-
dicates, we might then place Strauss in the camp of contemporary 
civic republicans like Professor Cass Sunstein; perhaps there is 
something in the air in Chicago. The only difference, and of course 
it is an important one, is that the contemporary civic republicans 
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are basically optimists about the possibility of achieving civic virtue 
in contemporary society, while Strauss was a pessimist, at least in 
that he believed contemporary society could not escape degeneracy. 
Indeed, Strauss's distinction between philosophers and statesmen 
shows that he believed civic republicanism was one of those neces-
sary fictions that philosophers could see through-thus their eso-
teric philosophy-but could not expose to public view-thus their 
exoteric philosophy. 
Finally, I have suggested that Strauss gives a right-wing flip to 
certain positions that have also attracted the left. As summarized 
by Drury, Strauss's critique of modernity sounds a lot like what 
Horkheimer and Adorno had to say about "the dialectic of enlight-
enment." Indeed, the similarities in this instance extend below the 
surface, because Horkheimer and Adorno were at least as pessimis-
tic about the prospects for modern society as was Strauss, although 
on Drury's presentation it seems that Strauss accepts modern de-
generacy with a stoic resignation, whereas Horkheimer and Adorno 
were enraged by degeneracy even though they saw no way to recon-
stitute a good society. 
All this adds up to the suggestion that Strauss probably does 
have some interesting things to say, which explains Drury's conclu-
sion that his work is "fascinating." On the other hand, the interest-
ing things seem to be embedded in a fog of words that, I suspect, is 
not worth the effort to penetrate. For students of constitutional 
law, perhaps the message of Straussian political theory is that they 
should read their texts very closely, paying particular attention to 
the genre and intended audience of the texts. Those of us who have 
spent a month or more of class time on Marbury v. Madison (or, in 
my classes, on The Federalist Papers) are unlikely to regard this as 
hot news. 
MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW. By Michael Perry. 1 
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If Professor Michael Perry did not exist, we would be tempted 
to invent him-as a paradigm of lawless jurisprudence. Professor 
Perry's first book, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights, 
was apparently designed to liberate constitutional analysis from 
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